Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Throughout the work, Ostrom highlights the flaws of traditional collective action theories when applied to small-scale CPRs. These theories often make erroneous assumptions while failing to explain what variables account for the successful management of a CPR. In exposing these flaws, Ostrom hopes to demonstrate why her own research presents a more accurate picture of small-scale CPRs.

The three theories of collective action—the tragedy of the commons, the prisoner’s dilemma, and the logic of collective action—all predict the destruction of the CPR without external intervention through central governmental regulation or privatization. These theories assume that appropriators act independently of one another and do not communicate with each other. Additionally, these theories exclude situational variables. They argue that there is only one rational choice for appropriators to make and that it will lead to the CPR’s destruction.

Ostrom argues that, in reality, appropriators do communicate with one another, and they often share cultural norms and observe each other’s behavior. They are often able to work out agreements among themselves to limit appropriation and sustain the CPR. Indeed, the appropriators are in the best position to formulate rules that will be workable and enforceable in local conditions.